

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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1. Stalin's last work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, and Malenkov's speech at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 show that the anticipated main weakness of the USSR is the development of a deep conflict between the authorities which set up production schedules and the working force itself. Stalin himself demonstrated that this conflict has deepened more and more and that the Soviet Government considers this extremely dangerous for the State.
2. Soviet policy as outlined in the article by D.I. Chesnokov, editor-in-chief of the magazine Kommunist (ex- Bolshevik), in issue No. 2 of 1953 of the magazine would have as its essential goal the defeat of capitalism by socialism. This policy is bound to manifest itself in the maintenance of competition and of strife in all domains, with the exception of armed conflict; that is, in the economic domain (or in Marxist language - the social) and in the cultural domain, which includes the ideological and the moral.
3. The elements of this Soviet policy will be the following:
  - a. The consolidation of the Soviet State.
  - b. The consolidation of the People's Democracies and the "democratic" groups in capitalist countries.
  - c. The denunciation of "warmongers".
  - d. Resistance to all foreign policy capable of opposing the interests of the USSR.
  - e. The organization of the Soviet "Fifth Column".
  - f. The exploitation of contradictions existing at the heart of the capitalist world and resistance to all that might unify and strengthen the capitalist world.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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4. Most of the commentaries which have appeared since the death of Stalin assert that Malenkov's policy is entirely different from that of Stalin in both external and internal spheres. Such an interpretation is considered erroneous. In reality, the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 showed that the USSR was going through a crisis that obliged it to modify its internal and external tactics, but it also indicated that there would be no change in the foundations themselves of the policy followed by the Kremlin. This policy appears always to be founded on two theses. From the external point of view, the leaders in the Kremlin always believe that the crisis of capitalism, although artificially moderated at times, will eventually become worse. From the internal point of view, there is always the question of the imbalance between production schedules and labor productivity.
5. These two theses were developed in Stalin's last work (The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR), and present tactics will be based on this rather than creating a new situation.
6. The reasons for the change of Soviet tactics observed since the 19th Party Congress arise from the following factors: the relenting of the economic crisis in the West and the existence of an internal conflict in the USSR. Therefore, in order to maintain for the State its role of direction in the construction of socialism and to overcome the internal conflicts, the State will continue to use the system of purges while making some concessions in the social and economic domain, occasioning a certain liberalism that already existed prior to the 19th Party Congress.
7. The new government would only profit from the situation created by Stalin's death by giving to these indispensable and long-planned measures the appearance of changes fundamental to the regime and by using them for propaganda ends. However, this policy of partial retreat should not in any case be considered a renunciation of the development of the centralization and the totalitarianization of the State. On the contrary, the reorganization of the executive power would demonstrate that the principles of Stalin concerning the structure of the state are maintaining their strength. It is only the propaganda that is changing form.
8. The new "liberalism" will not change in the least the principles of internal and external policy of the USSR nor will it modify the role which the Soviet Government plays as supreme regulator of economic and social life.

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